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Abstract: This article is an evaluation of Le Poidevin’s use of Carnap’s stance
on ontology within the philosophy of religion. Le Poidevin claims that () theists
need to take God to be a putative entity within space-time in order for their claim
that God exists to be meaningful, and that () instrumentalism about theology is
viable. I argue that although Le Poidevin’s response to Carnap’s argument is no
less problematic than that argument itself, his position is in fact thoroughly
un-Carnapian. The upshot is that his discussion provides some support to atheism,
but none to either of his two oﬃcial conclusions.
The questions of ontology, as they are usually understood, are questions
about what there is, or about what sorts of entities exist: are there numbers, prop-
ositions, tropes, temporal parts, arbitrary mereological sums, etc.? Contemporary
analytic philosophers tend to take these questions very seriously and to treat them
as questions worthy of sustained inquiry. On the other hand, meta-ontology, the
study of what ontology is and whether it is possible, is also ﬂourishing, and there
are a number of meta-ontologists who are sceptical either of the ontological enter-
prise as a whole, or of certain ontological questions. Some of these see themselves
as trying to revive the anti-metaphysical tradition that goes back to the writings of
Rudolf Carnap, who held a thoroughly deﬂationary view of ontology (as defended
e.g. in ‘Empiricism, semantics and ontology’ (henceforth ‘ESO’)).
In his article ‘Internal and external questions about God’ (as well as in parts
of his book Arguing for Atheism), Robin Le Poidevin oﬀers a sympathetic, though
ultimately critical, discussion of Carnap’s position. Interestingly, he applies
Carnap’s argument to the ontological question that is perhaps least often sus-
pected of being illegitimate or meaningless, namely the question of whether God
exists. Although he argues against Carnap’s deﬂationism, he takes Carnap’s
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argument to have two important implications for the philosophy of religion:
() theists need to take God to be a putative entity within space-time in order for
their claim that God exists to be meaningful, and () instrumentalists about
theology, who take talk about God to be non-descriptive have a defensible
position.
My aim in this article is to clarify and evaluate Le Poidevin’s argument for these
interesting and far-reaching conclusions. I argue that although Le Poidevin’s re-
sponse to Carnap’s argument is no less problematic than that argument itself,
Le Poidevin’s position is in fact thoroughly un-Carnapian. The upshot will be that
his discussion provides some support to atheism (either with respect to a timeless
God only or tout court), but none to either of his two oﬃcial conclusions.
The article is divided into three sections. In the ﬁrst section, I summarize
Carnap’s position as put forth in ESO and brieﬂy outline the particular version of
Carnap discussed by Le Poidevin, which Stephen Yablo () develops in detail.
In the second section, I examine Le Poidevin’s response to one of the more explicit
arguments from ESO and Le Poidevin’s own meta-ontological commitments. In
the third and ﬁnal section, I consider the implications of these commitments for
Le Poidevin’s conclusions with respect to the philosophy of religion.
Carnap’s view
Let us consider Carnap’s position, as laid out in ESO. Famously, that posi-
tion makes use of the notion of a ‘linguistic framework’, and of the accompanying
distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ existence questions.
If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce
a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this procedure the
construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in question. (Carnap (), )
A linguistic framework is made up of terms and expressions together with rules
governing those terms and expressions. For example, the numbers framework
consists of the following: number terms such as ‘three’; the general term ‘number’
and sentence forms like ‘three is a number’; expressions for properties (e.g.
‘prime’), relations (e.g. ‘is greater than’), and functions (e.g. ‘plus’), and sentence
forms like ‘two plus three is ﬁve’; numerical variables (e.g. ‘n’) as well as existential
and universal quantiﬁers governed by the usual deductive rules.
Note that not all frameworks are consciously constructed; nor are all
frameworks of a technical nature. For example, another framework discussed by
Carnap, which will be important in what follows, is the framework of things and
events in space-time (henceforth the ‘things framework’). That framework is
adopted by each of us ‘early in life as a matter of course’.
And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: ﬁrst, questions of the
existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework; we shall call them
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internal questions; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality of the system of
entities as a whole, called external questions. (Carnap (), )
Take the numbers framework. Examples of internal questions would be ‘How
much is three plus three?’ or ‘Is there an even prime number?’ These are answered
with the help of the rules of the framework; since the framework is a logical
one, the method of answering is logical also. In the case of frameworks that are not
logical but factual, such as the things framework, internal questions are answered
empirically. Thus, examples of questions internal to the things framework would
be ‘Did King Arthur actually live?’ or ‘Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?’
Now consider questions such as ‘Do numbers exist?’ or ‘Are there physical
objects?’ According to Carnap, such questions must be interpreted as either
internal or external questions. If they are interpreted as internal questions, namely
as questions internal to their respective frameworks, they have trivially positive
answers. Their answers follow analytically from positive answers to more speciﬁc
internal questions. Thus, from ‘There exists a prime number between three and
seven’, the proposition ‘There exist numbers’ can be derived, given the rules of the
numbers framework. Similarly, from ‘There is a white piece of paper on my desk’,
the proposition ‘There are physical objects’ can be derived, given the rules of the
things framework. Such trivial answers indicate that this is not the way in which
ontologists asking about the reality of numbers or the external world intend their
questions to be interpreted. However, the only other way they could be interpreted
is as external questions, and in particular, as external practical questions con-
cerning whether or not we should adopt certain frameworks. Clearly, this is not
what ontologists have in mind either: they mean to be asking a non-trivial
theoretical question. But it is not clear what meaning external questions might be
given that would make them theoretical rather than practical. This is why, in
Carnap’s view, ontological disputes are simply misguided.
Le Poidevin refers to something like the above as ‘Carnap’s argument’, but
I think it should be stressed that the above does not yet constitute much of an
argument for Carnap’s position, only a rough statement of it (I will reserve the
term for the argument discussed in the next section). In particular, we have not yet
been given any argument for the crucial claim that theoretical external questions
are meaningless.
There is also the prior question of what exactly we should take frameworks to be.
For my purposes, what matters is the way Le Poidevin construes the notion, as
implied by his construal of the internal/external contrast. He suggests that we
understand these notions by analogy with ﬁction (Yablo develops such a proposal
in detail; see below). Pieces of ﬁction correspond to frameworks, and internal and
external questions are questions posed from within and without those pieces
of ﬁction, respectively. Thus, a question like ‘Did Dorothea publish Casaubon’s
Key to All Mysteries?’ would be an example of a question that is internal to the
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ﬁctional framework ofMiddlemarch. A question like ‘Did Casaubon exist?’, unless
it is taken to ask whether in the novel Casaubon was merely a dream of
Dorothea’s, is a question that is external to the ﬁctional framework. It means
‘Did George Eliot base the character of Casaubon on someone she knew?’
Similarly, the question ‘Is Middlemarch true?’ is an external question asking
whether Middlemarch corresponds to reality, where ‘reality’ means our world,
namely the world in which George Eliot is real.
This construal of the notion of a framework is, as Le Poidevin suggests,
intelligible as far as it goes; it is also prima facie more promising than what Carnap
himself had in mind. Carnap, as we have seen, takes the answer to general internal
questions to follow analytically from speciﬁc internal statements. Thus, the answer
to the question ‘Do numbers exist?’, as posed from within the numbers frame-
work, follows analytically from e.g. ‘There is an even prime number’. That is, the
rules of Carnap’s frameworks are ‘analytically valid’ in the sense that they give the
sentences of the framework their meaning, so that as long as those meanings
are held ﬁxed, the rules are incorrigible. As is well known, this reliance on the
analytic/synthetic distinction made Carnap’s position vulnerable to the Quinean
critique, which Yablo neatly summarizes as follows:
The factors governing assertion are an inextricable mix of the semantic and the cognitive;
any serious question about the assertive use of ‘X’ has to do both with the word’s meaning
and the X-ish facts. Accordingly Carnap’s external stance, in which we confront a purely
practical decision about which linguistic rules to employ, and his internal stance, in which
we robotically apply these rules to determine existence, are both of them philosophical
fantasies. (Yablo (), )
Yablo suggests that if we give up on the idea that the rules of the X-framework are
what give the term ‘X’ its meaning, these problems are circumvented. Instead of
insisting that the rules of a framework are analytically valid meaning-conferring
rules we can allow that ‘X’ has a meaning prior to the adoption of the X-
framework. And then, in order to ensure that internal statements about X’s are still
not answerable to external standards, we construe frameworks as ﬁctions
(or ‘make-believe games’).
However, while prima facie more promising, this construal of the notion of a
‘framework’ is perhaps even harder to pin down than Carnap’s own: what counts
as part of a given ﬁctional framework? The analogy only goes so far. Yablo himself
says that compared to the literal/metaphorical distinction (on which his non-
make-believe/make-believe construal is loosely based), the analytic/synthetic
distinction is ‘a marvel of philosophical clarity and precision’. Moreover, when
understood as a global doctrine, this version of Carnap may well imply a thorough-
going relativism (as may, for all I know, Carnap’s own position). In any case, as we
shall now see, these problems are largely irrelevant to Le Poidevin’s argument.
The reason is that Le Poidevin’s own position is in fact thoroughly un-Carnapian.
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Le Poidevin’s response to Carnap
Consider now one of Carnap’s more explicit arguments for his central claim
that (supposedly) theoretical external questions, like ‘Are there physical objects?’
(or, equivalently for present purposes: ‘Are physical objects real?’, ‘Is there (really)
an external world?’), are meaningless. Carnap mentions questions internal to the
things framework, such as ‘Did King Arthur actually live?’, and then says:
The concept of reality occurring in these internal questions is an empirical, scientiﬁc,
non-metaphysical concept. To recognize something as a real thing or event means to succeed
in incorporating it into the system of things at a particular space-time position so that it ﬁts
together with the other things recognized as real, according to the rules of the framework.
From these questions we must distinguish the external question of the reality of the thing
world itself. In contrast to the former questions, this question is raised neither by the man in
the street nor by scientists, but only by philosophers. Realists give an aﬃrmative answer,
subjective idealists a negative one, and the controversy goes on for centuries without ever
being solved. And it cannot be solved because it is framed in the wrong way. To be real in the
scientiﬁc sense means to be an element of the system; hence this concept cannot be
meaningfully applied to the system itself. (Carnap (), )
This argument seems problematic to me, because it simply assumes that the only
sense of ‘real’ that might be relevant to the external question at issue is the one
associated with the things framework itself (the ‘scientiﬁc sense’). It is only on this
assumption that considerations about reﬂexivity and self-membership are relevant
at all.
Yet, it is these considerations that Le Poidevin focuses on in his response. He
ﬁrst points out that self-membership need not lead to paradox (e.g. the set of all
abstract objects contains itself), and that ﬁctions can make reference to themselves
(e.g. Gulliver’s Travels makes reference to itself as a journal). He then says that
what is really needed in response is an example of a framework that allows the
question of whether it reﬂects reality to be answered from within itself. He
construes this as a framework that ‘compels acceptance of itself’. The framework
he settles on for this purpose is ‘the framework about us’. Which framework this is,
Le Poidevin says, depends on how we view ourselves, but the framework he goes
on to discuss is the one that is based on a view of ourselves as things existing in
space-time.
Given the Cartesian conviction that I exist, anything spatially and temporally related to me
must also exist. So to deﬁne ‘real’ in terms of being located in the spatio-temporal
framework is not some arbitrary deﬁnition which we could have replaced with any other,
it is the most fundamental concept of reality. (Le Poidevin (), )
In this way, Le Poidevin means to counter the above argument and, pace Carnap,
to provide a meaning for genuinely theoretical external questions. These questions
are external to certain ﬁctional frameworks, though internal to a certain privileged
ﬁctional framework, namely the spatio-temporal framework that ‘contains us’.
(Note that this phrase is slightly peculiar given the deﬁnition of a framework as a
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system of expressions; in an earlier version of ESO, Carnap speciﬁes that by
‘framework’ he means only the expressions, not the entities. This confusion may
be partly responsible for some of the problems identiﬁed below.) And it is
precisely the ‘ontological authority’ of that framework that gives these theoretical
external questions their meaning, according to Le Poidevin. Because we cannot
doubt that we ourselves exist, we cannot help taking the framework ‘containing us’
to reﬂect reality.
The ﬁrst thing to ask about this response is this: isn’t, for all we are told, Le
Poidevin’s ‘us-framework’, at least as it is explicitly developed by him, identical
with Carnap’s things framework? After all, they are both the framework of things
and events in space-time. Le Poidevin explicitly calls the framework in question
‘the spatio-temporal framework’; Carnap, too, speaks of ‘the framework of things
and events in space-time’. Perhaps it may be objected that Le Poidevin
emphasizes that the ‘us-framework’ is deﬁned indexically (‘to be located in this
framework is to stand in some relation tome’), but if this is meant to signal that the
framework in question is not simply the things framework, much more needs to be
said about its nature. (For one thing, the mere presence of indexicals does not
disqualify a question from being internal to, and straightforwardly answerable
within, Carnap’s things framework: the question ‘Is there a white pen on my desk?’
is, for Carnap, a straightforward example of such a question.)
The second thing to ask is how exactly Le Poidevin has responded to Carnap’s
argument. That argument was supposed to establish that a question such as ‘Are
there physical objects?’, when it is intended as external to the things framework
and as theoretical rather than practical, is without sense. Le Poidevin is attempting
to supply such a sense to theoretical external questions. The sense he oﬀers is the
following: given any ﬁctional framework, we can ask about the framework as a
whole whether it reﬂects, or corresponds to anything, in reality, where ‘reality’ is to
be understood in the sense associated with the spatio-temporal framework. That
these questions are still internal to the spatio-temporal framework does not
threaten their signiﬁcance (i.e. make them objectionably limited in scope),
because of the ‘ontological authority’ of the spatio-temporal framework. Once we
adopt this framework, we cannot help taking it to reﬂect reality. But which sense of
‘reality’ is this? That, after all, was the question.
Given that Le Poidevin thinks there is no more fundamental sense of ‘reality’
than the one associated with the spatio-temporal framework, we may presume
that this is the intended sense. That would explain the attention he pays to
Carnap’s reﬂexivity objection. However, that objection then still looms large: what
sense does it make to take space-time to be real in the sense in which things and
events in it are real? It can hardly be ‘incorporat[ed] . . . into the system of things at
a particular space-time position so that it ﬁts together with the other things
recognized as real’. The realization that we ‘can’t help’ taking this framework to
reﬂect reality does not answer this objection, any more than it would to point out
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that metaphysicians can’t help asking about the reality of the external world. That
we are ‘compelled’ to accept the spatio-temporal framework does not make that
acceptance any more intelligible as a theoretical rather than a practical step: in
what sense can we thereby be said to have accepted the framework as real? The
claim that ‘we cannot coherently doubt that the framework of which we are a part
exists’ may even work in Carnap’s favour. If we cannot coherently doubt that there
is an external world, then perhaps this is all the more reason to think that the
question of the reality of the external world is meaningless.
Given this diﬃculty, one might wonder whether perhaps Le Poidevin, like
Carnap, does not actually take the question ‘Are there physical objects?’ to be
meaningful. It is true that Le Poidevin favours a deﬂationist stance on many
ontological questions, including all those that ask about the existence of abstract
entities like numbers or propositions (see below). But in fact, he does not mean to
extend this stance to the question about the reality of the external world.
Unfortunately, if that question lacked a sense to begin with, he has not supplied it
with one.
Which questions, then, have been supplied with meaning? The answer is: those
questions that are external to ﬁctional frameworks other than the special spatio-
temporal framework, asked from within the latter. Le Poidevin is suggesting that
asking about the reality of a given ﬁctional framework means asking whether
the ﬁction corresponds to (spatio-temporal) reality. The problem with this is that
those questions were never suspected of lacking meaning in the ﬁrst place, nor
was any other suggestion as to their meaning ever salient. Given any ﬁction, we
can of course ask whether it corresponds to anything in (spatio-temporal) reality.
As we have seen, Carnap did not object to such questions. True, he stressed that
they were internal questions, namely internal to the things framework: ‘Did King
Arthur actually live?’; ‘Are unicorns and centaurs real or merely imaginary?’ But
for Le Poidevin, too, these questions are internal, namely internal to the spatio-
temporal framework.
Nonetheless, it is quite clear that Le Poidevin views these questions very
diﬀerently from Carnap. For Le Poidevin, the spatio-temporal framework is
not one among many, nor is its privilege merely one of practical utility or even
indispensability. Le Poidevin does stress its indispensability, but only because he
takes it to indicate further that the framework also has a special ontological auth-
ority. The spatio-temporal sense of ‘real’ is, for Le Poidevin, the most fundamental
sense of ‘real’, and the one in terms of which all ontological questions should be
interpreted. So Le Poidevin ﬁrmly rejects Carnap’s characteristic pluralist stance
towards frameworks, assigning a unique privilege to one, namely the spatio-
temporal framework that ‘contains us’.
The claim that all ontological questions should be interpreted in terms of
spatio-temporal reality is controversial; moreover, it is in no way suited to the
deﬂationist view that ontological questions lack meaning, because it supplies
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a clear meaning to most of those questions. (As mentioned, the question of the
existence of the external world may be an exception.) Questions concerning the
existence of abstract objects, far from lacking a theoretical meaning, can then be
interpreted as asking whether there are any abstract objects within space-time.
Of course the answer will likely be ‘No’, but that is another matter (I return to
this point below), as is whether this is the question metaphysicians actually mean
to ask.
To sum up: although Le Poidevin’s response to Carnap is no less problematic
than that argument itself, Le Poidevin’s meta-ontological position diﬀers radically
from Carnap’s. Far from being a pluralist, Le Poidevin takes the spatio-temporal
framework to have ontological authority. So one might even wonder what work
the talk of ‘frameworks’ is doing for Le Poidevin, who after all, construes them as
something like ﬁctions. Perhaps the best thing to say is that the spatio-temporal
‘framework’ is not one ﬁction among many, because it is in fact nothing like a
ﬁction.
The response applied to theism
Finally, let’s consider Le Poidevin’s claims regarding theology and the
philosophy of religion.
Le Poidevin deﬁnes the ‘theistic framework’ as follows.
Firstly we introduce the term ‘God’ and associated expressions: ‘God is good’, ‘God is
unique’, etc. Secondly we introduce expressions linking the terms ‘God’ with the physical
object framework: ‘God created the universe’, ‘God loves his creation’, etc. Thirdly, we
introduce methods for deciding the truth of certain propositions. In part this will consist of
an authoritative text, such as the Bible, or Koran. The framework may also distinguish,
amongst the statements in the text, between those statements which are intended to be
read literally, and those that are intended as metaphorical or allegorical. (Le Poidevin (),
–)
Before discussing the relation between a Carnapian stance on ontology and
theology, Le Poidevin ably rebuts a number of prima facie objections to the idea
that the theological question ‘Does God exist?’ is a candidate ontological question.
He then points out what, in his view, would be wrong with a response that simply
granted Carnap’s argument and settled for construing the question of God’s
existence as an internal question about the existence of a particular kind of person.
I will refer to this strategy as the ‘internal strategy’ below. (Note that commen-
tators have pointed out that not all internal questions concern a subclass of a more
inclusive class (nor vice versa). But nothing will hang on this here.)
Instead of treating God as if he constituted a class of his own, we could treat him as a
member of a more inclusive class. The obvious class to pick is that of persons, since
traditional theism represents God as having many characteristics of a person . . . So ‘Does
God exist?’ should, according to this strategy, be read ‘Is there a person who is omniscient,
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omnipotent, and perfectly good, who created the universe, etc.?’ This can be answered
non-trivially, provided that the framework of persons includes a logical or empirical
procedure by which we can determine the answer. That is to say, provided that there is a
sound argument for the existence of God.
However, this strategy will not give us back full-blooded theism. The reason is that, for
Carnap, no internal question, even if it has a non-trivial answer, concerns the question of
what really exists. So even though we can reconstrue the question of God’s existence as a
speciﬁc question about a certain kind of person, the answer will not (if Carnap is right) give
us what the theist wants. (Le Poidevin (), )
As we have seen, Le Poidevin does not think that Carnap is right. However, he
does draw two far-reaching conclusions from Carnap’s argument: () theists need
to take God to be a putative entity within space-time in order for their claim that
God exists to be meaningful, and () instrumentalists about theology, who take
talk about God to be non-descriptive, have a defensible position.
Le Poidevin’s argument for these two claims can now be reconstructed as
follows. His discussion of Carnap is supposed to have established that a
deﬂationist attitude towards ontological questions is appropriate in the case of
existence questions about abstract entities, or entities outside of space-time, but
not appropriate in the case of existence questions about concrete entities, or
entities within space-time. Hence, when the question of God’s existence is taken
to be about a timeless God (one outside of space-time), a deﬂationist attitude
towards the question is appropriate, whereas if it is taken to be about a God within
space-time, a non-deﬂationist attitude towards the question is appropriate.
Unfortunately, the ﬁrst and key premise of this argument relies on a mistaken
appraisal of the results of the above discussion. Le Poidevin’s insistence on the
ontological authority of the spatio-temporal framework implies not deﬂationism
about abstract existence questions, but rather nominalism concerning abstract
entities. Insisting that all ontological questions be construed as questions about
the spatio-temporal reality of entities leads not to the view that asking about the
reality of abstract entities is meaningless, but to the view that abstract entities are
not real:
Suppose we think of ourselves as objects existing in time. Then, if we believe that something
stands in a certain temporal relation to us, and so, like us, it is a temporal object, then we
cannot but think of that object as real. The problem with abstract object frameworks is that
they are not deﬁned in terms of the relations they stand in to us, but rather the lack of such
relations: according to one kind of realism, numbers are objects outside time and space and
independent of any mind. That is why we are suspicious of conferring reality upon such
frameworks: there is nothing to give them ontological authority . . . What I am suggesting
here is that the natural position to adopt is an ontological parochialism, to believe in the
existence only of things of our kind, things which exist in time. (Le Poidevin (), )
When Le Poidevin claims that adopting the numbers framework ‘does not compel
us to think of numbers as real, because they are not “one of us”, so to speak’
(ibid.), he goes beyond what either his or Carnap’s argument has established; and
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as we have seen, he thereby makes a claim that sits uneasily with his suggestion
that all ontological questions should be understood in terms of spatio-temporal
existence.
If we now follow Le Poidevin in applying his argument to the question of God’s
existence, the implication is atheism, at least with respect to a timeless God.
Le Poidevin himself seems to acknowledge this:
If the fundamental concept of existence is that of spatio-temporal location, then when we
ask ‘Does God exist?’ we mean ‘Can we locate God in our spatio-temporal framework?’ But
if the theistic framework is one which emphasizes God’s ‘otherness’, his being utterly
diﬀerent from any familiar object, and in particular his being outside space and time, then
the answer to this question must be ‘no’. (Le Poidevin (), )
This is clearly in tension with the conclusion that the question of the existence of
a timeless God ‘would best be treated as a question about the advisability of
adopting the theistic framework, and not about the reality of God’ (Le Poidevin
(), ).
Le Poidevin’s discussion does not, then, support either his claim that in order to
claim meaningfully that God exists one must take God to be a putative entity
within space-time, or the more general lesson that instrumentalism about theology
is viable. I will close with some additional remarks concerning Le Poidevin’s
recommendation to take God to be a putative entity within space-time.
First, and perhaps less seriously, it is not clear that Le Poidevin’s response to
Carnap diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the ‘internal strategy’ he dismisses, namely the
response that grants Carnap’s argument and construes the question of God’s
existence as internal to the persons framework. Le Poidevin’s position makes the
question ‘external’, namely external to the theistic framework, but as mentioned,
this still leaves the question internal to the spatio-temporal ‘us-framework’.
Perhaps this is as intended, since Le Poidevin (, ) means to dismiss
the internal strategy only conditionally on the success of Carnap’s argument (‘the
answer will not (if Carnap is right) give us what the theist wants’). But the
methodology for determining the answer to the question which Le Poidevin
associates with the internal strategy is just what one would expect in the case of his
own strategy. It involves using logical or empirical procedures to construct and
evaluate arguments for the existence of God, in order to determine whether there
is a person such as God. Determining whether God is part of the spatio-temporal
‘us-framework’ presumably involves just such methods.
However, and this is the second worry, it is not clear how likely the methodology
appropriate to the spatio-temporal framework is to turn up a positive answer to
the question (and thus not clear how good a piece of advice for theists
Le Poidevin’s recommendation is). I am not here concerned with traditional
theological arguments for taking God to be a putative entity within space-time (or
time) as opposed to outside of it. There may be independent reasons for taking
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God to be within space-time. But as I have argued, for all we are told, Le Poidevin’s
spatio-temporal framework is identical with Carnap’s things framework. And
in order to be real in the sense of that framework, God would have to be such that
s/he can be ‘incorporat[ed] . . . into the system of things at a particular space-time
position so that [s/he] ﬁts together with the other things recognized as real,
according to the rules of the framework’. If we do adopt Le Poidevin’s ‘onto-
logical parochialism’, believing only in the reality of objects that are straight-
forwardly spatio-temporally related to and of the same kind as us, the result may
just be atheism (not only with respect to a timeless God, but tout court). Of course
this too may be as intended in some sense (the book is entitled Arguing for
Atheism after all), but it clearly diﬀers from Le Poidevin’s oﬃcial conclusions.
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Notes
. See Chalmers et al. () for a good overview of the current debate.
. Carnap (); note that all page references are to the reprinted version of the paper (see References).
. Le Poidevin ().
. Le Poidevin ().
. Le Poidevin argues that this is one way to interpret the position of radical theologians like Don Cupitt;
see e.g. Cupitt ().
. Gallois () defends this criticism of Carnap.
. Haack (), , makes a very similar point. Note that Bird () makes an interesting case
for taking Carnap only to claim that so far, no external theoretical meaning has been given to the
question. But I think the assumption that Carnap is not optimistic about the prospect remains
reasonable.
. At least that objection still stands if the ‘us-framework’ is identical with Carnap’s ‘things framework’
from ESO. As the quote suggests, the latter counts as real only things which can be assigned particular
space-time positions. A modiﬁed proposal might also include things which stand in spatio-temporal
relations to other things, or which exhibit spatio-temporal relations among their parts.
. He also rejects, I think, the thoroughgoing relativism which he ascribes (or recommends) to Carnap,
according to which statements are true or false only relative to frameworks (recall that on Le Poidevin’s
interpretation of Carnap, frameworks are more than language fragments, so this relativity is substantial;
for a diﬀerent interpretation, see Eklund ()). In Le Poidevin’s view, it seems, questions such as
‘Did King Arthur actually live?’ do have answers that are true or false.
Questions about ‘Internal and external questions about God’ 
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. See Chalmers et al. (). One might, for example, worry that it does not allow for a felicitous
characterization of the debate about which times exist, i.e. about whether the past and the future are
real (since one might think times cannot themselves exist at (spatio-)temporal positions, and that a
time, if it is real, is real in a diﬀerent sense from the sense in which things and events in (space-)time
are). But a modiﬁed proposal along the lines mentioned in n.  may be able avoid these problems.
. Note that the term ‘internal strategy’ might also have been an apt name for another strategy Le
Poidevin discusses, but which I do not comment on, namely the possibility of taking the question about
God’s existence to be internal to the theistic framework. Le Poidevin takes this strategy to be successful
exactly if the ontological argument succeeds (but he takes the ontological argument to fail).
. See Bird ().
. Carnap (), . This problem may not arise on a modiﬁed proposal along the lines mentioned in
n. .
. Work on this article was carried out while I was a member of the Swiss National Science Foundation
project ‘Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental –Metaphysical Perspectives on Contemporary
Philosophy of Mind’ (Sinergia, CRSI-).
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